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Abstract
In this paper we make some general remarks on the use of non-classical
logics, in particular paraconsistent logic, in the foundational analysis of
physical theories. As a case-study, we present a reconstruction of P. -D.
Fe´vrier’s ’logic of complementarity’ as a strict three-valued logic and also
a paraconsistent version of it. At the end, we sketch our own approach to
complementarity, which is based on a paraconsistent logic termed ’para-
classical logic’.
”He utters his opinions like one perpetually groping and never like one
who believes he is in possession of definite truth.”
Einstein on Bohr, apud A. Pais [37]
”Whoever writes a purely mathematical work can be considered as
the author of a novel. He has the same privileges that are conceded
pictoribus atque poetis. I can, v.g., invent a new curve and prove
various of its properties. I can write a treatise on optics, where I
take as an hypothesis that the light does not propagate according
to a straight line, but according to a circular curve, or according to
any curve whatsoever. And if my theorems and my solutions of the
problems were legitimately derived from the principles I have proposed,
no one can attribute to me any mistake.”
J. Anasta´cio da Cunha (Portuguese mathematician, 1744-1787) [14]
∗Partially supported by CNPq.
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1 Introduction
Why paraconsistent logic? (henceforth simply ’PL’). Generally, there is no
precise criterion for deciding whether a given abstract system can be regarded
as a well defined logic or not. This is usually determined by the scientific
community. Since nowadays paraconsistent logic is included among the best
known systems of logic (just see the 03B43 Mathematics Subject Classification)
[2], we can say that it has been accepted by the scientific community as a logic.
But, are there other reasons which justify the important role this kind of logic
has been assumed in present day scientific activity? Of course the study of this
particular case can help us in the understanding the role played by non-classical
logics in general.
The development of logic since the end of the XIX century has ascribed
to this discipline a fundamental role in practically every field of contemporary
knowledge, for instance in philosophy of science, metaphysics, ethics, math-
ematics, economy, computing sciences and even technology. Nowadays logic
is ’mathematical’ by nature, having rendered a field of knowledge which uses
mathematical techniques. So, as in mathematics, we can say that a system
of logic can be developed basically from two points of view: as a pure one or
as an applied one. ’Pure’ logic, as pure mathematics, can in principle be de-
veloped in abstracto, independently of possible applications. So, we can study
paraconsistent logic or intuicionistic logic by themselves, basically with the aim
of exploring their abstract mathematical properties. From this point of view,
in developing a logical system, the logician can proceed as Hilbert has sug-
gested, when he said that ”[t]he mathematician [or the logician] will have to
take account not only of those theories that come near to reality, but also, as
in geometry, of all logically possible theories” [28] (see also our second motto
above).
So, following these guidelines, we might develop abstract (pure) systems
where some principle of classical logic is violated, as for instance that principle
which entails that from contradictory premises any formula can be derived, in
symbols, α∧¬α ` β (Duns Scotus Law, which is valid not only in classical logic,
but in almost all the known logical systems, like intuicionistic logic). This is
the way taken by the Russian philosopher N. A. Vasiliev, who perceived that
the rejection of the law of non-contradiction could lead to a ’non-Aristotelian’
logic in the same way as the violation of the parallel postulate of Euclidean
geometry had conduced to non-Euclidean geometry. Vasiliev, as we shall recall
below, is one of the forerunners of paraconsistent logic. In fact, we can sum
up the meaning of paraconsistent logic in this way: it is devoted to the study
of logical systems which can base inconsistent theories (that is, theories which
have contradictory theses, like α and ¬α) but which are not trivial (in the sense
that not every well formed formula of their languages are also theses).
But in developing logic we could also proceed from the applied point of
view, looking at some domain of knowledge where our intuition feels that some
logic (in particular a paraconsistent one) could be useful for describing abstract
structures that reflect the way certain deductive inferences are made within
2
such a domain. One of the best known examples is provided by Birkhoff and
von Neumann’s approach to quantum logic, in saying that quantum mechanics
would demand a logic distinct from the classical one [4]. As examples involving
PL, we can recall that these logics have also been applied in technology, as we
shall mention in the next section. On the other side, it has been also claimed
that certain primitive civilizations (like the Azande) reason according to para-
consistent rules [39] (other examples shall be mentioned below). Of course we
are not sustaining that they (the Zande people) really reason this way, but in-
dependently either they do that or not, the very interesting philosophical and
anthropological discussions on the Zande way of reasoning can make sense only
if we have at our disposal well developed abstract logical systems which fit such
a possibility, for, without the (essential) formal counterpart, all discussions turn
out to be pure speculation.
In this paper, we shall consider PL more from the ’applied’ perspective, but
before to begin with, let us comment on a general misunderstanding about the
nature of PL. Sometimes we find someone saying that non-classical logics like
PL were proposed because we think classical logic is wrong and that it must be
replaced by a suitable one (in accordance with some philosophical criterion) [26,
p. 1]. This is the case, for example, of intuicionistic Brouwer-Heyting logic, if we
consider it as a culmination of Brouwer’s original philosophy of mathematics.
Brouwer’s stance implies that, in a certain sense, classical mathematics has
basic shortcomings and that a constructive mathematics should take its place;
the underlying logic of this constructive mathematics being a new one, different
from the classical. Nowadays, there are also some philosophers, especially in
Australia, who strongly believe that classical logic should be replaced by another
one (most of them think that the good logic would be a relevant logic).
But this opinion regarding classical logic does not fit ours. We think that
classical logic is a fantastic subject which has and will continue to have strong
interest and applications. The only problem is that in some specific domains,
as we shall show below, other logics, in particular paraconsistent logics, may
be more adequate for expressing certain philosophical or even technical reasons
so as to make explicit some of the underlying structures which (apparently)
fit more adequately what is being assumed in these fields, since classical logic
(apparently) can’t do that in full. This does not show that classical logic is
wrong, but that its field of application should be restricted. At least, the use
of non-classical logics in some fields helps us to better understand important
aspects of these domains.
A nice example is the discussion of the nature of negation, which has been
better understood with the raise of PL (another example is the significance of
Russell’s set –see [11]). Furthermore, it should be recalled that PL (in our view)
keeps classical logic valid in its particular domain of application. Really, in this
sense PL can be viewed not only as an ’heterodox’ logic (or ’rival’ logic [26],
that is, as a logic which deviate from classical logic in what respects some of its
principles), but also as a supplement to classical logic, for it coincides with this
one if we take into consideration just what are called ’well-behaved propositions’
(roughly, those propositions that obey the principle of non-contradiction). In
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short, and we hope this can be put definitively, at least according to our point
of view, we don’t intend to pray according to PL rules. PL may be useful in
some domains, as shown below, but we shall continue to use classical logic, or
other logics, when we find they are convenient or necessary.
We could also make the claim, with Granger [25], that paraconsistent logic
can and should be employed in some developments, but only as a preliminary
tool; in future researches, classical logic could finally be a substitute for it, as
the underlying logic of those developments. In addition, it is worthwhile to note
that constructive mathematics may be investigated from the point of view of
classical logic and that in this way we are able to get really significant results.
In synthesis, there are in principle various ’pure’ logics whose potential ap-
plications depend not only on a priori and philosophical reasons, but, above all,
on the nature of the applications one has in mind. Our aim in this paper is
only to call attention to some aspects of certain paraconsistent logical systems
originated by physical questions. Tough the subject didn’t achieve its definitive
form yet, it seems really stimulating, specially from the philosophical point of
view.
2 Paraconsistent logics: elements of its history
The forerunners of PL were specially the Polish logician Jean ÃLukasiewicz and
the Russian logician Nicolai I. Vasiliev (for further historical details, see [3],
[21]). Both, in 1910, following a ’pure’ point of view, have presented general
ideas which have contributed for the development of PL; ÃLukasiewicz discussed
the possibility of violating the ancient Aristotelian Principle of Contradiction,
but he did not elaborate any logical system to cope with his intuitions. It was
his disciple, Stanislaw Jas´kowski, who did that in 1948. Jas´kowski constructed
a system of propositional PL (known as discussive logic, in a piece originally
written in Polish; the English translation of his work appeared only in 1969
[30]), where he distinguished between contradictory –inconsistent– systems and
trivial ones, with the aim of 1) systematizing theories which contain contradic-
tions, as in dialectics, 2) studying those theories where contradictions are caused
by vagueness, and 3) directly studying empirical theories whose postulates or
basic assumptions are contradictory (for historical details, see [3], [21]). Vasiliev
was inspired by motivations quite similar to those of ÃLukasiewicz, although in-
dependently developed, culminating by presenting in 1912 and 1913 his system
of imaginary logic, which expresses his conception that contradictions do not
exist in our ’real’ world, but only in a possible world created by our mind (ibid).
Starting in 1953 and 1954, the first author of this paper began the devel-
opment of his ideas on paraconsistency (without knowledge of the above men-
tioned authors) in seminars given at the Federal University of Parana´, Brazil.
Reasoning from a ’pure’ point of view, he was motivated by certain mathemat-
ical problems, apparently being the first logician to develop the idea of PL as
a field of living research, containing infinitely many logical systems which turn
out to have relevant applications, as we shall see below (da Costa’s systems Cn,
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1 ≤ n ≤ ω, are nowadays well known; see [8], [10]).
The philosophical and the technical developments of these logics was re-
markable (the Third World Congress on Paraconsistency was held in Toulouse
in July 2003 [41]). Today, paraconsistent logic touches various areas like on-
tology, the philosophy of science, applied science, and technology, for example
robotics, expert systems, flexible computing and medicine (see for instance [1],
[36]). Moreover, the theoretical and technical counterparts evolved very much,
giving rise, for instance, to paraconsistent model theory, paraconsistent set the-
ory and paraconsistent geometry.
3 Paraconsistency and physics
The study of the relationships between logic and physics is a difficult and wide
topic which cannot be examined in just one short paper.
We may recall the relevance of the foundational analysis of physical theories,
a topic which is related to their axiomatization and of making explicit their
mathematical counterpart. Historically, the importance of such a study was
pointed out especially by Hilbert in the sixth of his celebrated 23 Mathematical
Problems [28]. This kind of analysis, as it is well known, was fundamental also
for the development of some XXth century philosophies, like neo-positivism,
and has echo also in the semantical view, so as in the ’structuralist’ approach
initiated by Sneed, Stegmu¨ller and others. However all of this is made within
the paradigm of classical logic.
Concerning the use of non classical logics in physics, there have been only a
few insights, not conclusive as far as we know up today. For instance, Bressan’s
suggestion of using certain modal logics was not fully developed; Reichenbach’s
three valued logic, although interesting from the point of view of the insights
and clarification of some basic assumptions underlying quantum mechanics, has
been criticized for not providing a full logical basis for such a discipline, mainly
due to the lack of a detailed discussion of quantification (the propositional level
of his logic does not suffice for physical purposes – see [27]). By the way,
when we hear something about the relationships between logic and physics, we
usually associate the subject with the so called ’quantum logics’, a field that
has its ’official’ birth in Birkhoff and von Neumann’s well known paper from
1936 [4]. Originally proposed to cope with some problems which are originated
from quantum mechanics (like the apparent violation of the distributive law
α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ≡ (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)), their fundamental work, which we could say
came from an ’applied’ stance (since their system was motivated by an empirical
science), caused the development of a wide field of research in logic. Today there
are various ’quantum logical systems’, which have been usually studied as pure
mathematical systems, practically far from applications to the microphysical
world and from the insights of the forerunners of quantum mechanics (for a
general and updated account on this field, see [20]). Recently, Dalla Chiara and
Giuntini presented a ’paraconsistent quantum logic’ ([18]; see also [19], [20]),
in which certain ’classical laws’, like the non contradiction and the excluded
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middle laws are violated, but their system will not be recalled here, in spite of
its importance.
3.1 Truth in Physics
Another kind of relationship between PL and physics came from M. L. Dalla
Chiara and G. Toraldo di Francia’s important concept of truth as applied to
physical theories. Informally speaking ([16, Chap. 3], [42, Sec. 1.10]) a physi-
cal law does not make reference to a specific physical system, but says that a
mathematical relation holds among the values of certain physical magnitudes, as
Newton’s second law f = m.a, which relates the magnitudes ’force’, ’mass’ and
’acceleration’. More generally, a physical law may be written as P (x1, . . . , xn),
where P expresses the mathematical relation which holds among the magni-
tudes x1, . . . , xn. However, when we ask for the meaning or the truth value of
a certain physical proposition, we need to make reference to certain states of
physical systems, which we do in the metalanguage of our physical theory. In
this metalanguage, we also describe experiments and measurement processes,
and in particular we introduce certain operational definitions for the relevant
physical magnitudes.
Given an operationally defined concept like force, F , it is assumed that due
to the imprecision of measurements the acceptable values lie within a certain
interval of real numbers (with an ’error’ ², which represents the precision of the
instruments). For instance, given an operationally defined concept F of force
related to a physical system s, there is an interval [f − ², f + ²] ⊆ R such that
whatever value p in such an interval can be accepted as the value of F for the
system s in a certain state; in this case, we may say that F is equal to f with
precision ².
Within this semantic schema, it is possible to introduce the concept of a
’physical model’ as a structureM = 〈M,E, T 〉, where M stands for the mathe-
matical counterpart of M (for instance, usual functional analysis in the case of
quantum mechanics), E is the ’experimental’ counterpart of the model, which
is composed by a class S of physical systems whose states are determined by
certain physical magnitudes ’operationally defined’ (what means that any mag-
nitude is associated to a class of procedures suitable to provide the calculation
of the values of this magnitude with a certain characteristic precision ²), and T
is a translation map, that gives a mathematical interpretation to the elements
of E.
Then, the authors characterize the concept of a sentence α being true with
respect to a physical system s ∈ E as follows. Firstly, α must be defined
with respect to s, which intuitively means that what α asserts ”has a meaning
with respect to s” [15, p. 165], that is, supposing that α is the proposition
P (x1, . . . , xn), then each of the magnitudes occurring in α determines a physical
quantity Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) which can be measured in s (usually, they are
represented by operators). Then, the results of the measurements in s of these
physical quantities must admit n values g1, . . . , gn that in the mathematical
counterpartM of the model satisfy the relation P with a prescribed precision ².
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When this is the case, we say that α is true with respect to s, written ²s α, and
that α is true in the model M, in symbols, M |= α, if and only if α is defined
for at least one s ∈ E and, for any s for which α is defined, then ²s α (ibid.).
For instance, let us take again Newton’s second law f = m.a. The three phys-
ical variables appearing in this equation correspond to three physical quantities
force (F), mass (M) and acceleration (A), whose acceptable range of values for
a certain physical situation s lie respectively within three intervals [f1, f2] ⊆ R,
[m1,m2] ⊆ R [a1, a2] ⊆ R, each one of them expressing a certain precision ²
for the measurements. Then ²s f = m.a when there exist three real numbers
p1 ∈ [f1, f2], q1 ∈ [m1,m2] and r1 ∈ [a1, a2] such that p1 = q1.r1.
However, due to the imprecision ², there may be also other three real numbers
p2, q2 and r2, each one in the respective interval, so that p2 6= q2.r2, and these
numbers are also acceptable values for the measurements of the corresponding
physical quantities (in the same way as we could accept that in measuring our
table we can find ’something like’ 1.20 m). So, ²s ¬(f = m.a) too, that is, the
negation of Newton’s law should also be true with respect to the same physical
situation s. This way, we may have, for a sentence α and physical situation
s ∈ E, both ²s α and ²s ¬α, but of course not ²s α ∧ ¬α, for this last case
would entail the existence of three real numbers p′, q′ and r′ belonging to the
respective intervals such that ²s p′ = q′.r′ ∧ p′ 6= q′.r′, which is impossible [15,
p. 168].
This definition of truth reflects a kind of empirical truth, having interesting
consequences pointed out by the authors, like the non truth-functionality of the
logical connectives, in the sense that the truth of a conjunction is not equivalent
to the simultaneous truth of both conjuncts. To us here, it is interesting to note
the ’paraconsistent aspect’ of this definition of truth. It is clear from the above
that this concept is related with paraconsistency, for we can have both ²s α
and ²s ¬α. Truly, in [13] it was shown that the logic which describe this
phenomenon is a particular paraconsistent logic, namely, a Jas´kowski’s logic
(one of the characteristics of this kind of logic is that from α and ¬α we don’t
necessarily derive the conjunction α ∧ ¬α).
3.2 Fe´vrier’s logic of complementarity
Among the suggestions for the use of non-classical logics in physics, we recall
those which are related to three-valued logics. The best known cases are those of
H. Reichenbach and P. Destouches-Fe´vrier, although Fe´vrier’s logic isn’t strictly
a three-valued logic,1 since the truth tables for the connectives are not functions
from the cartesian product of truth-values to the set of truth-values. In what
follows, after making some remarks on her ’logic of complementarity’, we present
a reconstruction of it as a strictly three-valued logic, and afterwards we introduce
a paraconsistent version of it.
1Although frequently mentioned in the literature, Fe´vrier’s system Lc,3 has not been dis-
cussed in detail; for instance, S. Haack [26] only mentions Fe´vrier’s logic Lc,3, while Jammer
[29] considers it, but without discussion on the logical system proper. We think that this is
due to the fact that her system was never presented in a systematic way.
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Let us first recall that the concept of ‘complementarity’ was introduced in
quantum mechanics by Niels Bohr in his famous ‘Como Lecture’ in 1927.2 The
consequences of his ideas were fundamental for the development of the Copen-
hagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and constitute, as is largely rec-
ognized in the literature, one of the most fundamental contributions for the
development of quantum theory. Notwithstanding their importance, Bohr’s
ideas on complementarity are controversial. Truly, it seems that there is no
general agreement on the precise meaning of his Principle of Complementarity.
Although some authors like C. von Weizsa¨cker and M. Strauss have tried to
elucidate Bohr’s principle from a logical point of view, their developments never
found an acceptable agreement from the scientific community. For instance, it
is well known that Bohr himself rejected von Weizsa¨cker’s attempt of logically
describing his principle (cf. [29, p. 90]). Strauss’ proposal of a logic in which two
propositions, say α and β (which stand for complementary propositions) may be
both accepted, but not their conjunction α ∧ β, was considered as ’inadvisable’
by R. Carnap, although it seems to deserve attention from a present day point
of view.3
In a series of papers, which culminated in the presentation of the book La
Structure des The´ories Physiques [22], P. Destouches-Fe´vrier sketched a propo-
sitional logic to deal with complementary propositions, termed Lc,3.4 Her main
motivations for developing Lc,3 are Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Relations, which
according to her are to be taken as basic physical principles and not as con-
sequences of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory [29, p. 362]. The
central idea is that the composition (read: the conjunction) of complementary
propositions like those referring to position and moment of a certain particle, are
to be regarded as propositions incomposables, to which the logical conjunction
should not be performed. But even so she writes p&q for such a conjunction,
and says that it has to have the logical value absolutely false, A. In other words,
even by taking for granted that there are ”propositions incomposables, pour
lesquelles on ne peut jamais affirmer le produit logique” [22, p. 33], she assumed
that the conjunction of these propositions has a third true value, distinct from
true and false, the absolutely false, which according to her would indicate that
such a conjunction could not be performed in a strict sense (this shows that her
system is not in conformity with standard many-valued logic).
Fe´vrier uses a binary connective ’&’ for conjunction, but in reality it is taken
to stand ambiguously for two distinct conjunctions: one for the ’composable’
propositions and another for the ’incomposable’ ones, and both conjunctions are
characterized semantically by a kind of ’generalized matrices’.5 Perhaps we can
motivate the use of these connectives following Nagel (cf. [35]): if ’ai’ is defined
as ’The coordinate qi of a particle i has value q0i ’ and ’bi’ as ’The component
pi of the momentum of the particle i has the value p0i ’, then there are two
2All the references of this section, not explicitly referred to here, may be found in [12].
3Mainly if we take into account Jas´kowski’s discussive logic [13].
4See the reviews of some of her works [33], [34] and [35].
5She does the same concerning disjunctions, also using ’∨’ ambiguously for both composable
and incomposable propositions.
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matrices for characterizing respectively the conjugate product ’ai&bi’ and the
non-conjugate products ’ai&ak’, ’bi&bk’ and ’ai&bk’ for i 6= k (these matrices are
presented below). So, at the bottom she distinguished (by some meta-rule, not
made explicit) between propositions which can and which cannot be composed,
by introducing appropriate connectives (conjunctions and disjunctions) to link
them.
Here we interpret her proposal by distinguishing between two conjunctions,
namely, &c, which link ’composable propositions’, and &i, to be used for the
incomposable ones (similarly for disjunctions). So, using matrices like Fe´vrier’s,
we can interpret Lc,3 as a standard three-valued logic (we shall use the same
notation, Lc,3, to designate the resulting system). We remark that in our system
we shall always perform conjunctions. To be more precise, we adapt Fe´vrier’s
terminology, taking as basic the following connectives &c (first conjunction), &i
(second conjunction), ¤ (exclusive disjunction), ∨c (first disjunction), ∨i (sec-
ond disjunction), ≡ (first equivalence), ' (second equivalence),→ (implication),
N (first negation) and ∼ (second negation), which are defined by the following
matrices, whose designated truth-value is T ([22, pp. 34-39]):
&c T F A
T T F A
F F F A
A A A A
&i T F A
T A A A
F A A A
A A A A
¤ T F A
T A T T
F T A F
A T F A
∨c T F A
T T T T
F T F F
A T F A
∨i T F A
T A T T
F T A F
A T F A
≡ T F A
T T F F
F F T F
A F F T
' T F A
T T F F
F F T T
A F T T
→ T F A
T T F F
F T T F
A T T T
p T F A
N p F T A
∼ p F T T
The problem (as already pointed out by Nagel in his review [35]) is that she
doesn’t provide any criterion for distinguishing between propositions which can
and which cannot be composed. Some meta-rule is to be supposed. Anyway,
by following her ideas, and accepting that such a distinction can be made (the
way we shall present her system below, by accepting that conjugate or comple-
mentary propositions can always be joined by the connectives &i and ∨i, makes
such a rule dispensable), the intuitive explanations of these symbols may be as
follows. &c is the conjunction of propositions which can be composed (’com-
posable’ propositions), while &i is the conjunction of complementary proposi-
tions (whose conjunction receives the truth value A, the absolutely false –’faux
absolu’). So, according to Fe´vrier’s interpretation, the consideration of two
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(complementary) propositions like
p =df ”the component px of y has a value between p0 and p0 ±∆p0 at time t”
q =df ”the coordinate x of y has a value between x0 and x0 ±∆x0 at time t”
are subjected to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, hence their conjunction
p&iq has to have truth value A if ∆p0 and ∆x0 don’t satisfy Heisenberg’s
inequality. The connective ¤ stands for (as she says) a generalization of the
classical exclusive disjunction; p¤ q is true when only p or q is true, absolutely
false when the propositions (which can be composed) have the same true value
and false otherwise.
The connectives ∨c and ∨i are the disjunctions which link propositions which
can and which cannot be composed respectively. ≡ has the same motivation
it has in classical logic, so that p ≡ q is true if and only if both p and q have
the same true value. But ' is a little bit different: p ' q is true when either p
and q are both true or not true, and it is false when one of the propositions is
true and the other is not true, that is, F or A. The table of the implication →
generalizes the classical material implication.
Now concerning the negations. Due to the semantic characterization of the
connectives, it results (as noted by Fe´vrier) that the Double Negation rule does
not hold for ∼, so that N(p&xq) is not equivalent to Np ∨x Nq, where x is
in both cases either c or i. The same can be said concerning ∼ (p&xq) and
∼ p∨x ∼ q. Other results are given by the theorems below (proven from the
matrices above, taking T as designated).
We remark that our reconstruction of Fe´vrier’s logic is not in accordance
with her views, although it surely reflects some of her intuitions regarding the
logic of quantum mechanics. Taking validity and the semantic concepts defined
as usual, we have the following theorems, where Latin letters will stand for
formulas and capital Greek letters for sets of formulas:
Theorem 1
(i) We have in Lc,3:
² p→∼∼ p
² p&i ∼ p→ q
² p&iNp→ q
²∼ (p&c ∼ p)
²∼ (p&iNp)
²∼ (p&cNp)
² (p→ q)→ ((p→∼ q)→ p)
² p∨i ∼ p
² p→ (q → p)
² p&cq → p
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² p&iq → p
(ii) The Deduction Theorem holds in the following form: if Γ, p |= q, then
Γ |= p→ q.
(ii) Modus Ponens is a semantical valid rule of inference: if both p and p→ q
are true, then q is true. Other semantically valid inference rules are:
p,∼ p ∨c q ² q, ∼ p, p ∨i q ² q.
Theorem 2 The following formulas express that p has the values T, F and A
respectively:
p ≡∼ (p&ip)
p ≡∼ (p ≡ p)
p ≡ (p&ip)






p&c ∼ p→ q
p&cNp→ q











(∼ p→ p)→ p
(p→ q) ≡ (∼ p ∨c q)
(p→ q) ≡ (∼ q →∼ p)
(p→ q) ≡ (Nq → Np)
(p→ q) ≡ (∼ q → Np)
(p→ q) ≡ (Nq →∼ p)
(p→ q) ≡ (∼ p ∨i q)
(p→ q) ≡ (Np ∨i q)
(p→ q) ≡ (∼ p ∨c q)
(p→ q) ≡ (Np ∨c q).
Although Fe´vrier did not develop her logic in detail, she made some inter-
esting remarks on complementarity, based on her informal discussion. As she
says, even if we mix up the values F and A, her logic does not reduce to classi-
cal logic. So, she concludes, ”within a theory where Bohr’s complementarity is
introduced, it is impossible to use classical logic for the calculus of experimen-
tal propositions; it is necessary to use a logic of complementarity” (op. cit., p.
40). This is expressed by means of ’Fe´vrier’s theorem’: In a theory where the
experimental propositions satisfy a complementary condition, it is necessary to
use a logic of complementarity which is irreducible to classical logic (loc. cit.).
However, Fe´vrier does not confine her logic to experimental propositions.
Speaking of complementarity and wave mechanics, she concludes that comple-
mentarity logic is necessary also for dealing with theoretical propositions which
are deduced within a schema which includes complementarity, hence her logic
being also applicable to theoretical propositions. According to her,
”. . . la logique de comple´mentarite´ ne joue plus seulement pour les
e´nonce´s expe´rimentaux, mais aussi pour les e´nonce´s the´oriques, ce
qui va imposer une structure toute nouvelle a` la me´canique ondula-
toire.
”Ceci fait apparaˆıtre un autre aspect de la comple´mentarite´ de Bohr,
plus profond que celui s’est re´ve´le´ par les raisonements de Heisenberg
sur les mesures, et qui est la comple´mentarite´ entre l’aspect corpus-
culaire et l’aspect ondulatoire. Cette fois il ne s’agit plus d’une
simple comple´mentarite´ de fait, mais une comple´mentarite´ de droit,
qui doit faire partie du corps meˆme de la the´orie, et non plus eˆtre
seulement une limitation aux possibilite´s expe´rimentales.” (ibid.,
pp. 44-45).
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Her belief that the complementarity logic is the right logic for a theory involv-
ing complementary propositions makes her able to answer the three questions
posed at the beginning of her book, which are close to F. Gonseth’s ideas that
logic has an empirical face, so that the principles of logic should express general
physical laws; the first, asking whether logic is universal and unique, normative
and a priori, expressing the laws of a pure reason and not expressing any contend
of knowledge, is answered in the negative. The same holds for the second ques-
tion, which asks whether logic is arbitrary under certain conditions of coherence
(consistency) and hence being a kind of tautology, that is, a syntax independent
of all knowledge. But the third question is answered positively; the question
asks whether logic, in each of its applications, should be adapted to the domain
of knowledge in which it will be applied. In this case, logic would not be neither
a priori and independent of whatever application, nor an arbitrary syntax: as
she says, ”[n]ous voyons qu’il n’y a pas une logique unique et universelle, nor-
mative a priori, exprimant les lois d’une raison pure, et inde´pendante de toute
connaissence (. . .) mais qu’elle est adaptee´ a` chaque domaine de connaissance,
en particulier a` chaque the´orie physique, et que, par conse´quent, elle exprime un
certain contenu de connaissance” [22, p. 41]. Classical logic, she says, due to the
above ’Fe´vrier’s theorem’, is suitable for classical physics, including relativity
and ”a certain theory of fields” (ibid.), complementarity logic being the logic
adequate for quantum theories.
It is important to observe that if in Lc,3 we call a proposition normal if and
only if it can assume only the truth-values T or F, then the propositional logic
of normal propositions is the standard propositional calculus. This implies that,
in a determinate sense, classical logic is contained in Lc,3 (of course, this way we
may introduce normal predicates etc., and rebuild classical logic inside Fe´vrier’s
system). In order to do that, one has to give a (metalogical) definition of
normal proposition, predicate, etc., as well as one needs to characterize Fe´vrier’s
incomposable propositions.
Before sketching a way of looking to Lc,3 from a ’paraconsistent point of
view’, we shall turn to some criticisms that were presented to her system and
philosophical position.
3.3 Some criticism
In 1954, McKinsey and Suppes made a review of Fe´vrier’s book in which they
presented several criticisms to the idea of employing her logic in physics and in
particular to her ’theorem’ mentioned above, which says that modern physics
demands a logic with more than two truth-values [34].6 McKinsey and Suppes’
review is important not only for their discussion of Fe´vrier’s theses, but for
presenting to the reader interesting insights related to a general discussion on
the relation between logic and physics.
Let us begin by recalling in short some of the main arguments against
Fe´vrier’s ideas. The first objection is concerning with Fe´vrier’s ’theorem’ above,
6In the same volume, McKinsey published a critical review of another work of her where
similar views are defended [33].
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in conformity with which quantum theory would demand a three valued logic.
McKinsey and Suppes (in short, McK-S) don’t see why this would be necessary,
and according to them Fe´vrier’s arguments are not conclusive. We don’t want
to discuss this topic now, for it will be treated below within a more general
context. But McK-S also say that in order to base a physical theory on a non-
classical logic, it would be necessary to present such a field as a formal system,
and Fe´vrier doesn’t do that. They still suggest that before completing such
an ”herculean labor”, perhaps it would be better to get an axiomatization of
quantum theory in the ’ordinary mathematical sense’, through a set-theoretical
predicate formulated in standard set theory (hence, using classical logic), as
they themselves (with Sugar) made with classical particle mechanics (see [38]).
Of course, the use of classical logic, although keeps physics with an adequate
mathematical apparatus for expressing physical laws and results, opens the door
for formidable philosophical problems that arise in connection with the use of
standard set theory in quantum mechanics, as shown for instance in [9] (see also
[10]) and [17]).
McKinsey and Suppes’ criticism that Fe´vrier restricted her system to the
sentential calculus, while quantifiers should be used in whatever logic suitable
for quantum mechanics, is of a deep nature. Interesting to remark that the same
criticisms were made by Hempel concerning Reichenbach’s three valued logic [27]
and by Church in what respects Birkhoff and von Neumann’s non-distributive
logic [7]. We think that they are right in this point. If Fe´vrier had restricted the
idea of complementarity, and hence the application of the connectives &i and
∨i, to ’experimental propositions’ only, the situation would be more satisfactory.
In this case, we could say that her sentential calculus concerns experimental
propositions only, which could obey the laws of her three-valued logic, and so
keeping classical logic to cope with the metamathematical discourse, including
the use of quantifiers, and maybe set theory. But this is not what she does. As
already recalled above, Fe´vrier intends that her system can be extended also to
wave mechanics (cf. [22], pp. 43ff).
Keeping in mind the possibility of reconstructing classical logic inside our
Lc,3 (as remarked at the end of the last section when we talked about ’normal’
propositions), criticisms like those of McKinsey and Suppes can be surmounted,
and so the door is open to sustain the thesis that Lc,3, even in the form proposed
by Fe´vrier, is the underlying logic of a possible axiomatization of quantum me-
chanics: the truth-value A only appears in connection with experimental propo-
sitions, the remaining ones being two-valued. Therefore, as we have indicated,
one can make a synthesis of Lc,3 and classical mathematics.
This kind of discussion shows that the axiomatization of a given empirical
theory is not something which is always totally determined. It depends on the
several aspects of the theory that we consider, explicitly or implicitly, appropri-
ate to take account of it. So, for example, Ludwig [31] studies an axiomatization
of quantum mechanics based on classical logic. Both stances, that of Fe´vrier
(according to our interpretation) and that of Ludwig, are in principle right, since
they treat different perspectives of the same empirical domain, and only the fu-
ture of physics will perhaps decide which is the better solution, what involves
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pragmatic factors.
3.4 A paraconsistent look on Fe´vrier’s logic
Let us define a logic Lpc,3 with the same language as that of Lc,3, and giving to
the connectives the same semantic characterization above. But now, we take T
and A as designated truth-values. That is, we take the matrix (with the same
tables as above)
M = 〈{T, F,A}, {T,A},&c,&i,¤,∨c,∨i,≡,',→,N,∼〉
to characterize what we will call the ’paraconsistent complementarity three val-
ued logic’. The notion of semantic consequence of a set of formulas is introduced
in the standard way: we say that a proposition p is a consequence of a set Γ of
propositions, in symbols, Γ |= p, if and only if for all valuations in which the
propositions of Γ have a designated value, p has also a designated value.
It is easy to see that p&i ∼ p is a tautology of Lpc,3 (that is, it has always
a designated value, namely, A), but not every proposition of its language is a
tautology, for instance, p&c ∼ p is not. Hence, Lpc,3 is inconsistent (perhaps
we should say ’∼-inconsistent’, for this inconsistency is related to the second
negation ∼) though it is not trivial and, as it is easy to see, can be the underlying
logic of inconsistent but non trivial theories; that is, it is paraconsistent.
In our logic every proposition receives a truth value (T, F or A), so do
p&iq and p&cq. But when p and q are complementary, the first conjunction
always receives the designate value A, while the second one obeys the table
for &c. Then, the two conjunctions of such propositions can be meaningfully
performed. We remark that this approach resembles Reichenbach’s logic in
that quantum propositions have always truth-values. This is in accordance
with physics, where we can meaningfully speak of position and momentum of a
certain particle, although the problem whether the position and the momentum
can be both precisely measured at the same time is subjected to Heisenberg’s
principle. In Lpc,3, the formulas assuming only T and A are those which are
acceptable.
Lpc,3 constitutes a propositional logic with the help of which we are also able
to talk about the foundations of quantum mechanics, similarly to what happens
with Lc,3. In addition, it is possible to extend L
p
c,3 to a strong paraconsistent
logic to cope with theoretical contradictions and to make it strong enough to
encompass a great part of extant mathematics. Thus, we have another alterna-
tive road to found some parts of quantum mechanics, in addition to Fe´vrier’s
and Ludwig’s systems.
3.5 Using paraclassical logic
In [12], we followed another way to surmount some of the problems of quantum
mechanics. To give an idea of this alternative, firstly let us introduce a new
kind of physical theory, whose language is supposed to contain complementary
propositions; such theories are called C-theories or complementary theories.
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A C-theory has a language, possesses a set of axioms, and its notion of
consequence, also called paraclassical consequence, is introduced as follows: if
Γ∪{p} is a set of formulas of T , then we say that p is a paraclassical consequence
of Γ, and we write Γ `P p, if and only if
(i) p ∈ Γ, or
(ii) p is a classical valid formula, or
(ii) there exists a consistent (according to classical logic) subset ∆ ⊆ Γ such
that ∆ ` p (in classical logic).
Let us suppose that a C-theory T be such that there are formulas p, q and
r of its language satisfying the conditions (a) T,`P p and T,`P q; (b) T, p `P r
and T, q `P ¬r. In this case, we say that p and q are complementary theorems
of T ; despite (b) above, it happens that in general r ∧ ¬r is not a theorem
of T . So, in a C-theory, we may deal with propositions like ’x is a particle’
and ’x is a wave’, each of which entailing the negation of the other, without
the consequence that they will conduce to a strict contradiction, that is, to a
formula of the form r ∧ ¬r.
It is important to remark that, according to our approach, complementary
propositions are not necessarily such that one of them is the negation of the
other (this is a particular case) but, more generally, propositions each of which
having consequences which may contradict some consequence of the other. This
is, we believe, in accordance with some of the ideas raised out by Bohr himself,
as we have emphasized in [12], although we shall not develop this topic here.
Anyway, our definition is quite general and of course is not restricted to physics,
being useful in other situations as well. Let us give an example, which could be
more elaborated.
Suppose a judge who is confronted with ’complementary normative propo-
sitions’ that should hold simultaneously, like to preserve the free will of the
citizens and to preserve also the obligations imposed by the State. In doing so,
sometimes a contradiction may arise. For instance, take the case of some prison-
ers who are going hungry to conquest some advantages, say more time for visit.
The judge, under the ’complementary’ situation of having to take into account
both the free will of the prisoners in going hungry to sustain their position and
the role of the State in preserving one’s life (since such a strike may conduce
some prisoners to serious illness), is confronted with a situation involving com-
plementary propositions (normative complementary propositions). This kind of
situation exemplify very well that ideas involving complementary situations are
not restricted to physics, as Bohr himself had already suggested [6]. Anyway,
interesting it may be, this topic shall be left to be analyzed in another time.
4 General remarks
We are inclined to agree with some of Fe´vrier’s remarks (which, as mentioned
above, follow a tendency derived from Gonseth [24, Chap. 8]), mainly uphold-
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ing that applied logic has an empirical counterpart. Nevertheless, we have some
observations to make. First, taking into consideration our distinction between
pure and applied logic, it is not necessary to eliminate the a priori traces of
logic. Of course we are not simply endorsing the position that there is just one
logic and that it is independent of whatever field of knowledge. What we say is
that logic can be studied independently of any application, as a pure mathemat-
ical system, hence being a priori in certain sense. Any applied logical system
possesses an a priori dimension and an a posteriori one. For instance, we could
begin by studying Fe´vrier’s system, which is supposed to be motivated by the
empirical science, verifying whether it can be axiomatized, afterwards proving
a completeness theorem and so on. From another point of view, logic deals
with the underlying structures of inference of particular domains or theories,
and in this sense a field like the quantum world may suggests that a different
logic (that is, other than classical logic) could be useful to cope with certain
features which cannot be dealt with by means of classical logic. As an example,
if we accept the view (advanced by E. Schro¨dinger, M. Born and others) that
quantum objects are non-individuals, having no individuality in the sense that
one is always indistinguishable of any other of a similar species, then it seems
that in looking at the quantum world as constituted by entities of this kind,
classical logic (with its Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles) and
classical mathematics (founded on the very notion of set, that is, collections of
distinguishable objects), should be revised (concerning these points, see [23]).
So, different ’perspectives’ of a domain of science may demand for distinct log-
ical apparatuses, which put us on a philosophical point of view very different
from the classical.
The possibility of using non-standard systems does not necessarily entail
that classical logic is wrong, or that (in particular) quantum theory needs at
the moment another logic. Physicists probably will continue to use classical
(informal) logic in the near future. But we should realize that other forms of
logic may help us in the better understanding of certain features of the quan-
tum world as well, not easily treated by classical devices, as the concepts of
complementarity and of non-individuality show.
To summarize, we think that there is not just one ’true logic’, for distinct
logical (so as mathematical and perhaps even physical) systems can be useful to
approach different aspects of a wide field like quantum theory. If we push this
view a little bit, although we shall not develop this philosophical point here,
we could say that our philosophical position may be called pluralist (but not
relativist).7
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